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THE NEAR DISCOVERY MISSION:
LESSONS LEARNED
R. H. Maurer and A. G. Santo
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, MD 20723-6099 USA

Abstract

Under a contract from NASA The Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
built and launched a spacecraft that will
rendezvous and orbit the near earth asteroid 433
Eros. The Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
(NEAR) spacecraft is the first under NASA's
Discovery Program, which is a series of low cost
solar system missions. While in orbit around
Eros the spacecraft will measure the bulk,
surface, and internal properties of the asteroid
for 10 months. This paper describes the lessons
learned from design, test, and fabrication that
are appropriate to other programs in quick
development, or of an interplanetary nature.
I. Introduction

In any program there are important lessons
learned that can benefit other programs. The
NEAR mission is unique in its opportunity for
lessons learned in that it was the first interplanetary mission for The Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/
APL). In addition, because of the short 27 month
development time, the length of the design
iteration and optimization stage was short.
The building of the NEAR spacecraft caused
the generation of 13 waivers and 227 Problem!
Failure Reports. Waivers were created before any
subcontracted subsystem was accepted as flight
hardware if performance did not meet specification. Waivers also were created when the final
spacecraft configuration, after completion of all
testing, fell short of a performance goal.
The Problem/Failure Reporting (PFR)
system requires all flight hardware anomalies

to be documented beginning with environmental
acceptance testing at the subsystem or box level
and continuing throughout build-up, integration
and test of the complete spacecraft. The PFR
system requires that the anomaly be documented
by the test engineer and analyzed and corrected
by the lead subsystem design engineer. Verification of the implementation of the correction(s)
requires the signatures of a review board
consisting of the subsystem design engineer, the
spacecraft integration engineer, the spacecraft
systems engineer and the program performance
assurance engineer.
Much of the history of the NEAR spacecraft
is contained in the records of the waivers and
PFRs. Section II of this paper will give an
overview of the NEAR design philosophy.
Section III summarizes the parts procurement
and subsystem fabrication activities. Section IV
discusses the significant waivers for NEAR.
Section V gives a detailed exposition of the
notable technical problems that occurred in the
execution of the subcontracts. Section VI
summarizes all 227 PFRs by presenting the
results of a statistical analysis. Section VII
discusses design decisions. The summary and
recommendations are found in Section Vill.
II. NEAR Mission Design Philosophy

Reliability of the NEAR spacecraft and instruments was maximized at the outset by
limiting the number of movable and deployable
mechanical and electromechanical systems since
such systems have proven to be frequent sources
of failures in recent near-Earth and interplanetary
missions. New technology was used when it was

----

--------------------------------------------------

necessary for the execution of the mission and
not because it was neat to do.

(1) The purchasing and receiving functions
were consulted early in the program to
obtain cooperation in expediting the
procurement of flight parts. As a result
orders for long lead items were placed
about 12 weeks sooner than the normal
processing had previously produced.

The reliability philosophy was implemented
specifically by:
(1) not allowing any deployable instrument
booms even for the magnetometer;
(2) using fixed RF communications antennae;
(3) using deployable but fixed solar arrays;
(4) permanently fixing the instruments onto
the spacecraft structure, allowing them
movable filter wheels and requiring that
deployable covers have viewing ports in
them.

(2) The number of specialized purchase
instructions (PIs) was minimized so that
the activity of writing the PIs would
delay procurement only when absolutely
necessary.
(3) Once parts orders had been placed with
manufacturers or distributors, periodic
follow-ups were made to monitor and
expedite the delivery of the order. In
several cases orders had to be placed with
a second vendor when it became apparent that the original vendor would not
meet the quoted delivery date.

New technology was employed:
(1) in the gallium arsenide solar arrays
necessary for the proper energy/mass
density in a photovoltaic system for a
deep space mission;
(2) in the IBMlLORAL 4MX4 LUNA-C
DRAMs composing the solid state
recorder taking advantage of the mission's very mild radiation environment
and eliminating the reliability hazards
inherent in tape recorders;
(3) in the gamma ray spectrometer that is
constructed by having the sodium idode
detector crystal inside a bismuth germinate crystalline shield for rejection of the
interplanetary gamma ray background;
(4) in the laser rangefinder which was a
scaled down but more reliable version
of one flown on Clementine; and
(5) in the system of software autonomy rules
developed to maintain the spacecraft and
continue the mission between infrequent
contacts with Earth through the Deep
Space Network especially during the
cruise phase.

(4) Incoming inspection and testing of flight
parts at JHU/APL was minimized. Only
activities that verified receipt of the
correct devices and added value for flight
quality were performed. Repeating tests
or screening done by manufacturers was
eliminated.
Generic parts issues were the cracking of
ceramic capacitors in both active devices and
filtered connectors and the lack of a standard
foot print for D shell connectors (filtered and
unfiltered) from different vendors.
The project leader from the fabrication
department was a member of the engineering
team and provided weekly status reports at the
team meetings. These reports tracked such things
as board designs, drawing sign-offs, board
fabrication, assembly and delivery. A total of 118
flight boards were built. Tracking flight spares
from the beginning is recommended since these
items often become flight hardware. Tracking
revised subsystem schedules should also be done
since it makes the downstream schedule
compression visible.

III. Parts Procurement and
Subsystem Fabrication

The parts procurement process was streamlined for the NEAR program. Four major changes
were implemented.
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The third waiver for the IMU system was
because it did not meet specifications with respect
to six of twenty performance parameters. The rate
bias and rate bias stability deficiencies were compensated in the on-board guidance and control
software. The other four parameters such as tumon time were marginal versus the specifications and
could be accepted as inconsequential.

Separate, small shop focus meetings were
held with the program office each week. Issues
with individual subsystems were resolved in
these smaller gatherings. A packaging engineer
was assigned to each subsystem or box. At the
end of the boardlbox design phase, but before
fabrication, a Fabrication Feasibility Review was
held to resolve major issues as early as possible.
When flight fabrication was completed, photo
documentation was necessary but it had to be expedited so that it did not delay test and integration.

In post vibration measurements two gyro
alignment axes were determined to have shifted
by 34 and 70 arcsec instead of within the
specified 20 arcsec stability requirement. A
fourth waiver on the IMU system was then
written and the latest values for gyro axes
alignment were inserted as updated information
in the IMU EEPROM.

Some specific fabrication issues of general
interest will be mentioned in closing this section.
Specifications on paint thickness and some
mechanical tolerances should be relaxed since
many configuration control discrepancy documents were created due to overly tight specs for
which the resolution was "use as is." All
cosmetic problems should not be ignored since
they are sometimes symptomatic of poor
workmanship; but overly conservative specifications do cost time, money and paper.

It should be noted that the constraints of the
rapidly paced NEAR schedule meant that the
IMU had to be integrated with the spacecraft in
mid-summer 1995 allowing no time for fine
tuning and mechanical stability adjustments.

The remaining significant waiver concerned
the solar panel interconnects. The solar cells on
the panels were interconnected by a web of silver
which was advertised as a mesh but was really a
rigid metal lattice. Silver was used for its low
resistivity on the NEAR panels since the mission
would be in sunlight most of its life and not
experience the many light-dark or hot-cold
cycles of a low Earth orbiter.

We found that laser cut co-therm gaskets
could be used if cleaned properly of carbon
deposit after cutting. We also avoided massive
point-to-point wiring as much as possible.
IV. Waivers

Of the thirteen (13) waivers written for the
NEAR mission, four involved the Inertial
Management Unit (IMU). The first of these four
waivers concerned the gyro operation and
control when it was found that although four
gyros were on board, it took an unacceptably
long time to power and utilize all four simultaneously. NEAR uses only three gyros at a time.

However, testing of the qualification panel
in temperature cycling and thermal vacuum
yielded breakage levels in the silver interconnects which revealed the panels to be limited
life items. Therefore, the thermal vacuum temperature profile for qualification of the flight
panels was descoped to reduce stress. The range
of the temperature profile was reduced by 10°C
which still met standard workmanship test
criteria but was not as robust as the cycle normallyemployed.

The vibration sensitivity of the IMU required
a second waiver which changed the operation
to keep the IMU unpowered throughout launch;
turning it on after the spacecraft separated from
the Delta rocket to avoid any substantial drift. It
was determined that the 450N thruster on board
the spacecraft produced a vibration level that was
too low to disturb the IMU.

Substantial thermal cycling of the qualification panel and test coupons indicated that
3

for the memories in the NEAR recorder and a
second for 1000 hours at 125°C with a DRAM
distribution screened for high ISTBY samples.

the solar panel interconnects could readily meet
the NEAR mission four year requirement if the
number of thermal cycles with temperature
excursions exceeding LlT = 30°C were limited
to a number in the hundreds rather than in the
thousands. Mission operations was informed and
is limiting the number of spacecraft swings from
Sun-pointing for optimum power to Earth
pointing for optimum communications especially during cruise mode at times when the sunspacecraft - Earth angle and, hence, the temperature cycle is largest.

v.

Forty-three (43) devices successfully completed the 85°C life test. Twenty (20) of these
had standby currents exceeding 1mA initially
and twenty-three (23) did not. The distribution
after 1000 hours was exactly the same. All other
electrical functions and parameters were acceptable. The high current leakage while undesirable
did not prove to be fatal.
Twenty-two (22) devices successfully
completed the 125°C life test with one DRAM
that was within specification initially having an
ISTBY of2 rnA after 1000 hours. Again all other
parameters and functions were acceptable.

Technical Problems

Encountered on Subcontracts
DC/DC Convertors

Both performance and fabrication problems
were experienced with the convertors. The
excessive overshoot of one particular kind of
convertor was solved by using a clamping diode
circuit of JHUIAPL design. Suspected damage
to capacitors during the fabrication of the
convertors was eliminated as an issue when the
manufacturer at JHU/APL's direction mounted
the capacitors on a separate daughter board and
eliminated high thermal mechanical stress due
to the soldering of the mother printed circuit
board by mounting the capacitors in the last
fabrication step before lidding the convertors,
after all soldering had been completed.

The Solid State Recorders were accepted as
fabricated by the vendor.
Oscillators

Two oscillators, one in the Telemetry Control
Unit (TCU) and another in the Command and
Telemetry Processor (CTP), from the same
vendor experienced stability problems. The TCU
oscillator had excessive noise and instability over
its required temperature range. After several
interchanges with the vendor and an attempt at
correcting the problem, we replaced the oscillator with a similar but not identical one from a
second vendor. Fortunately, the new oscillator
was in the flight stockroom as it had been
purchased for the NEAR Guidance and Control
system.

4MX4 DRAMs

During the manufacture of the NEAR Solid
State Recorders the vendor notified us that in
some lots 25-50% of the LDNA-C DD3 4MX4
DRAMs exhibited high standby currents.
Currents with values as high as 20-25 rnA were
observed compared to the manufacturer's
specified value of 1 rnA. Questions about the
end-of-life capability and performance of the
Solid State Recorders led JHUIAPL to conduct
two life tests; one for 1000 hours at 85°C with a
DRAM distribution representative of that used

The CTP oscillator had an unterminated
CMOS input as a result of a design error which
created voltage instability and threatened to
cause failure due to overheating. Samples were
returned to the vendor, corrected and requalified
in the CTP system at JHU/APL after a more
aggressive approach was taken by the program
with respect to design review and quality assurance support.
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Magnetometer Electronics

The first was the approval, use and derating
of individual transistors and integrated circuits.
In particular, the inadequate derating of a power
PET led to several problems with the inrush
current limiter of the NEAR transmitter. The
gate-source voltage for a JANS2N6849 device
was derated only 10% instead of the standard
25%. This condition led to failure in the limiter
due to overshoot and was resolved by both eliminating a potential shorting configuration and
finding an individual power FET device that was
robust enough to withstand the overshoots
encountered in testing.

The NEAR Magnetometer was Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE). However, shoddy
fabrication procedures produced an electronics
board on which many Field Effect Transistors
(FETs) were shorted to board traces by flux
contamination. JHUIAPL replaced more than 20
of these 2N5434 FETs with those of a second
manufacturer from existing flight stock and
cleaned and requalified the board.
Infrared Spectrometer Pin Puller

After more than ten (10) test firings the NIS
(NEAR Infrared Spectrometer) pin puller that
opens the NIS door was not operating correctly.
Inspection by mechanical design engineers
indicated that some gouging and galling damage
was occurring in the pin puller channels due to
design deficiencies. Mating surfaces were refurbished in the JHUIAPL shop and the number of
subsequent pin pull tests was limited to less than
five to prevent a repeat of the problem.

The second problem area had to do with the
qualification of a non-hermetic hybrid used in
the laser power supply (LPS) as a Q-switch
driver. The original hybrid chosen for the LPS
had a large substrate which was cracked in thermal shock screening. A second smaller hybrid
suffered failures in thermal vacuum qualification tests. Failure analysis attributed these failures to corona problems in the uncoated nonhermetic hybrids due to inadequate bake-out,
contamination, wire pigtails and a redundant
process which applied protruding ball bonds
over stitch bonds. Solution to this problem involved cleaner hybrids with conformal coating
and vent holes in the hybrid lid. In addition, flight
units underwent an extensive bake-out before
LPS fabrication and were allowed to outgas for
36 hours upon entrance into vacuum or repressurization before power was applied to the LPS.

High Gain Antenna Point

Upon receipt of the High Gain Antenna, it
was tested in the JHUIAPL thermal vacuum
(TV) test chamber as part of its space qualification. Following the TV test the paint was
chipped or cracked in four areas. Two possibilities existed as causes for failure; either the
mold release compound from the dish manufacture had not been completely removed or the
primer had not been applied correctly.

The third problem area was the vibration
qualification of the laser optics train. Two
separate failures occurred, one when qualifying
the laser transmitter itself and a second when
qualifying the complete rangefinder, which were
caused by the inadequate epoxy attachment of a
corner cube and a Risley prism respectively. In
both cases substantially more epoxy had to be
applied to these optical components and their
mounts so that they could successfully meet
NEAR vibration requirements.

With the help of Goddard Space Flight
Center personnel, the antenna dish was stripped,
cleaned and repainted. It was then requalified
both with respect to its performance on the
antenna range and in the TV chamber.
Laser Rangefinder

The laser transmitter encountered three
major problems in its fabrication and qualification at the vendor and JHUIAPL.
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(1) the Guidance and Control subsystem had
a significantly higher number of anomalies while the Propulsion system had
less;

VI. ProblemiFailure Reports (PFRs)

The most significant results of the PFR
activity were highlighted by the statistical
analysis of means on Poisson distributed count
data produced by a four way classification. The
four factors used for classification were spacecraft subsystem, cause of the anomaly, hardware
versus software and the time period before the
field activity at Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC) and Kennedy versus the time period
after the field activity began.

(4) as many anomalies occurred after going
to the field as before.

With respect to the analysis of the main
effects of the four factors:

As Figure 1, the NEAR PFR matrix, shows,
there were 60 PFRs written against the Guidance

(2) there were more software anomalies than
hardware ones;
(3) significantly more problems were caused
by design with fewer caused by workmans hip and parts;
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including JHU/APL's responsibility for mission
operations. Design emerges as the primary cause
for anomalies due to the extensive software
design activities that occurred after integration
of the spacecraft. Figure 2 shows that while the
number of hardware PFRs decreased from
October 1995 to February 1996, the majority of
software PFRs occurred after October 1, 1995.
Thus, the total number of PFRs before and after
going to the field were not significantly different.
It should also be noted that because of the
holidays and the launch activity, the amount of
testing in December 1995 and January 1996 was
limited.

and Control subsystem and only five against the
Propulsion system. There were 129 software
anomalies versus 98 hardware problems. The
causes for 128 anomalies were attributed to
design with only 37 due to workmanship and 9
to parts. There was no significant difference
between the number of PFRs generated before
going to the field (119) and the number generated
during testing at Goddard and Kennedy (108).
The differences that were demonstrated are
significant at a 95% confidence level.
The Guidance and Control subsystem and
its software will be discussed below. Other
software anomalies occurred with the insertion
of autonomy rules into the spacecraft command
system. The greater number of software versus
hardware anomalies emphasizes the complexity
and amount of code implemented for NEAR

The analysis of means on the two factor
interactions showed that greater numbers of
anomalies were produced by the appropriate
combinations of:

50

47

40

30

Hardware

••- - - - - - - .

Software

)*(-----~)(

:::E:
IZ

0
:i

25

a:
w
a..

20

In

a:
w
a..

18
15

16

10
4

0

TIME

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

6/95

7/95

8/95

9/95

10/95

11/95

12195

1196

Figure 2. NEAR PFR Matrix

7

(1) the design of the Guidance and Control
subsystem software after going to the
field due to the complexity of the G&C
subsystem for an interplanetary mission
and the fast paced NEAR schedule which
required writing and debugging flight
computer software in the field;
(2) the design of the science instrument
hardware before going to the field reflecting the less mature design of the
instruments, particularly the x-ray/gamma ray spectrometer, and the design of
doors and door opening mechanisms;
(3) the basic spacecraft design before going
to the field due to wiring, interface and
connector problems (hardware) and the
correct implementation of autonomy
rules (software);
(4) the ground support (test) equipnlent
software design.

New rules can be uploaded to RAM, but they
are not preserved across processor resets. Some
reprogrammability of the CTP EEPROM could
have greatly simplified the autonomy design. For
example, the response to Low Bus Voltage (LVS)
is tailored to the portions of the mission with
the lowest power margin, which corresponds
only to about six months out of the four year
mission. To recover from LVS during this period,
the Solid State Power Amplifier must be
unpowered for 24 hours, thus extending the time
needed to reacquire the spacecraft. If the
response to this condition could be permanently
reprogrammed, the amplifiers could be turned
on immediately after LVS throughout most of
the mission, when there is ample solar array
output.
Other simple changes could have improved
the autonomy design. For example, significant
effort is expended to guard against an analogto-digital (AJD) converter failure that causes
multiple channels to saturate. Unless carefully
handled, a single failure of this nature results in
false indications of multiple failures, triggering
autonomous actions that could themselves
cripple the spacecraft. By creating a special AID
converter output with the sole purpose of
checking the AID converter health, autonomy
could be disabled on the affected side, if a failure
was observed. Another improvement to the
autonomy design would allow rules to operate
on computed values. For example, the autonomy
rules that check for short circuits must operate
on current readings that vary with bus voltage.
It is difficult to detect an over-current unit, while
avoiding false triggers due to low bus voltage.
Truly, the rules should operate on power, calculated from the voltage and current readings.

The low number of anomalies attributed to
workmanship and parts after subsystem test and
spacecraft integration can be directly linked to
the excellent jobs done by the Technical Services
Department with respect to configuration control
of workmanship discrepancies during fabrication
of the NEAR subsystems and by the Space
Department's Reliability Group with respect to
parts' procurement and screening (before the
PFR system activities begin).
VII. Spacecraft Design

In the course of working with a spacecraft
design, shortcomings and disadvantages of
various design decisions will inevitably be
noticed. In a program with a short development
cycle, improvements cannot always be implemented on the current program. During the
NEAR development, several improvements for
future designs were noted.

The telemetry, system outputs fixed-length,
8800-bit transfer frames. In emergency mode,
each transfer frame takes approximately 15
minutes to transmit. Much of the data contained
in the nominal mode transfer frame are not
needed for recovery from an emergency. If a

While the Command and Telemetry Processor (CTP) default autonomy rules are stored
in EEPROM, it is not reprogrammable in flight.
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shorter transfer frame were defined in emergency
mode containing only important parameters, the
frame synchronization time would be shortened,
and critical telemetry parameters could be
sampled at a higher rate.

increased by unpowering a receiver when not
needed. Finally, the power saving resulting from
unpowering one receiver would boost the power
margin by 3% and greatly simplify the low
voltage emergency recovery procedures. If the
command receivers were on switched power,
such that both receivers could not be turned off
at the same time, the effect of the conservative
design would be achieved, since autonomy could
be used to switch receivers in case of a failure.

Although the command system hardware
supports eight uplink rates ranging from 7.8 bits
per second (bps) to 1000 bps, only two rates (7.8
and 125 bps) were implemented. While this
marginally simplified the command system, it
greatly limited the ability to change the on-board
reprogrammable software. For example, to
upload one of the redundant sides of the Guidance and Control subsystem will require 12
hours. Three uplink rates should have been
implemented: the 7.8 bps emergency rate, the
125 bps rate which can be used over the medium
gain antenna throughout the mission, and the
1000 bps rate over the high gain antenna for large
memory uploads. Another way to mitigate the
time required to reprogram is to partition the
flight software so that changes can be made
without requiring the entire memory to be uploaded. This approach, however, complicates the
software design, adding unwanted risk.

Throughout the course of integration and test
the guidance and control system required several
software loads. Unfortunately, the guidance
processor did not have a separate test port.
Consequently, to avoid disassembly of the flight
cabling interfaces the software loads were done
via the flight command system at 125 bps. This
caused each load to take several hours and
created bottlenecks in the processing schedule.
Test ports should be required on all units that
contain significant amounts of reprogrammable
software.

All commands are decoded in the Command
and Telemetry Processor software. The software
is protected by two hardware watchdog timers:
a 1 Hz timer and a 12.1 day timer. If the 1 Hz
timer fails to catch a software problem, the
command system will be unusable for 12.1 days.
A hardware command decoder could have been
implemented with a single additional high
density programmable logic device to reset the
processor from the ground.

"Test it as you fly it" is the common sense
theme of many design reviews. However,
because of the lack of integration between the
ground system computers testing in flight-like
conditions with the safing software enabled was
cumbersome. The quality of the test program
would have improved if more of the system level
testing was done in flight-like conditions.
Similarly, the use of mission operations test time
would have been improved if more testing was
done in a realistic operations environment, i.e.,
low downlink data rates and significant round
trip light time delays.

The redundant command receivers are wired
through unswitched power. This conservative
approach is traditional for low Earth orbit
spacecraft with omni -directional antenna
coverage. The spacecraft is protected from a
short circuit through fuses. This design is
vulnerable, since a soft short circuit failure may
not blow the fuse, but drains the spacecraft power
system. Receiver reliability would also be

This spacecraft was JHU/APL's first use of
the 1553 data bus interface for a flight
application. Use of the 1553 data bus proved
extremely beneficial as it enabled off-the-shelf
procurements, off-the-shelf test equipment, and
a standard well defined interface that saved
weeks of integration and test time. In addition,
the bus provided a simple way for the ground
based attitude control and determination
9

simulator to insert sensor stimulus and read
actuator commands from the flight system
without the use of expensive test ports.

varied greatly. Of most interest is the ability to
predict the rate of flight software problems by
the rate of ground test problems. The software
that had a "low and flat" error rate during the
last few months of ground test has been flawless
in flight; the software that had a "moderate and
decreasing" error rate prior to launch has shown
problems during flight at a rate comparable to
the pre-launch.

With a streamlined documentation approach
the subsystem and component level design
reviews are the cornerstone for program communication and design verification. Of exceptional
benefit to the program was the participation of
experts from JPL and NRL in design reviews
where JHU/APL had little experience in the
context of a deep space mission. In particular,
the outside reviewers greatly improved the
robustness of the telecommunication and safing
designs. A good example is in the area of data
rate selection. A design review suggestion to
lower the "nominal" uplink and downlink data
rates simplified operations and increased system
reliability by enabling the spacecraft to maintain
a conservative Sun pointing attitude over the
whole mission.

For low cost programs with complex software there are a limited number of people that
will have the know ledge to adequately test the
system. Testing 24 hours a day is of little benefit
in a case where only one shift of skilled test
personnel are available. For each program there
will be a solution where cost is optimized by
selecting a balance between team size and program duration. The NEAR program erred on the
side of having too few test personnel. This
created a problem that was most evident during
the final month of testing, when the number of
shifts per day, not the available number of hours,
limited the amount of testing.

While for hardware the development process
is well understood, there existed a non-uniform
approach to the software development process.
As would be expected, the quality of the
software, both in-house and subcontracted,

Throughout the entire program mass was the
main spacecraft driver. Figure 3 shows the dry
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mass history. The program started with 17%
margin and launched 5 kg extra fuel, (1 %
margin). It can be seen that the dry mass had a
steady upward trend of about 1% per month
during the design and fabrication phase (11193
till 3/95), was relatively flat during the integration and test phase (4/95 till 2/96), and had a
small jump near the end of the program. The
increase at the end was due to the thermal
blankets and the spin balance mass, both of
which were carried as estimates until they were
installed at the launch site.

original design philosophy that limited the
number of deployable and movable hardware
items. Aggressive monitoring of the various
subcontracts resulted in most subsystems being
delivered early or on time. Helping the vendors
solve problems quickly often meant numerous
phone calls and frequent travel on short notice.
JHUIAPL's willingness to monitor, run or repeat
tests and evaluations often filled know ledge gaps
or resolved uncertainties.
With several subcontracts, particularly the
science instruments, we decided that JHUIAPL
could have done a more efficient job in-house
especially with respect to spaceflight quality of
design. We only lacked the necessary confidence
at the beginning usually because of the fast paced
schedule. In contrast, we cannot think of a case
in which a task was performed at JHUIAPL that
we subsequently decided that we should have
executed a subcontract for that task.

Finally, for every processor that has reprogrammable software there was supposed to exist
a functionally equivalent breadboard model and
appropriate simulators that could be used for
both pre-launch and post-launch testing. For the
safing software this proved to be difficult as a
complete spacecraft simulator was originally
seen as not necessary and otherwise cost
prohibitive. Consequently, all of the safing software was debugged and acceptance tested using
the spacecraft. This approach is not recommended because:

The analysis of the ProblemIFailure Reports
demonstrates the need for
(1) better commnication between lead engineers to minimize interface problems and
(2) a more disciplined approach to software
development and quality control.

(1) flight hardware is susceptible to damage
during safing software checkout,
(2) the amount of safing testing is limited by
the use of available spacecraft test time,
(3) checkout of the safing software uses
spacecraft test time at the expense of
other systems, and
(4) after the spacecraft launches it is impossible to modify the sating software or test
the interactions of safing with spacecraft
operations.

In addition, consideration must be given to use
flight computer systems that are user friendly,
offer readily available development tools and
provide platforms for accurate simulation of
integrated tlight tasks in the laboratory concurrent
with the hardware fabrication.

In retrospect, the importance of a sating software
simulator was underestimated. Work is now
underway to assemble a complete spacecraft
simulator.
VIII. Summary and Recommendations

Much of the success of the NEAR mission
was due to ability of the program to follow the
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